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Abstract
This paper evaluates poverty sensitivity to growth in mean incomes and distributional
changes in Italy across its regions and over a period spanning from 1977 to 2004. We use the
“Survey on Household Income and Wealth” (SHIW) of the Bank of Italy to estimate the growth
incidence curves and the income and inequality elasticities of poverty. Growth strongly de-
termines the patterns of poverty; however, inequality appears to have strikingly characterized
it as well. A 1% increase in mean income produces a reduction in the headcount index by
around 2.8%, while a 1% increase in inequality increases it by around 2.2%. The heterogeneity
in poverty rates between North, Centre and South may be due to the strong heterogeneity in
the poverty elasticities, which in turn depend on the initial conditions of inequality and the
initial level of development.
JEL: D31, I32, O52
1 Introduction
Along with the intensification of the research to understand the microeconomic causes of poverty
movements, macroeconomic aspects of poverty changes have attracted renewed interest. How are
the gains of growth distributed to the poor? What are the effects of economic growth on poverty
rates? Further, what are the effects of distributional changes on poverty trends?
Although most of the attention on these issues has focused on the developing world1, sev-
eral features of the recent trends in advanced countries, in terms of poor economic performance
and increasing inequality, provided the stimulus for this paper to analyze the impact of growth
†E-mail: vincenzo.lombardo@uniparthenope.it. Department of Economics, University of Naples
Parthenope, Italy. I would thank all the participants at the INEQ Summer School on “Inequality: Mechanisms, Ef-
fects and Policies”, Siena – June, 2007, the DEFAP 4th International Workshop on “An opportunity for equality of
opportunity”, Milan – December, 2007, the WIDER Conference on “Frontiers of Poverty Analysis”, Helsinki - Septem-
ber, 2008, the seminars at the University Parthenope - Naples and at the University La Sapienza - Rome. All remaining
errors are mine.
1See among others, Adams (2004); Araar et al. (2009); Besley and Burgess (2003); Besley and Cord (2007); Bour-
guignon (2003); Chen and Ravallion (2003); Dollar and Kraay (2002); Eastwood and Lipton (2000); Epaulard (2003);
Essama-Nssah and Lambert (2009); Kalwij and Verschoor (2007); Klasen (2008); Ravallion and Datt (2002); World Bank
(2005)
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and inequality on poverty trends in Italy. The huge recession of the 1990’s, the recent distribu-
tional changes describing Italy as one of the most unequal of the advanced countries (Brandolini,
2005), the strong dualistic structure of its economy resulting in high differentials in standard-of-
living between northern, central and southern regions, all motivate the attention of this work as to
whether, and to what extent, growth and inequality have influenced the poverty changes across
Italian regions.
It is widely recognized that economic growth is necessary to achieve poverty reduction; its
impact on the poverty rate depends, however, on how its benefits are distributed across the popu-
lation. Inequality has entered into the growth-poverty nexus because of both its direct and indirect
effect - through the growth channel - on poverty rates. Given a mean income, lower inequality may
reduce static poverty; to the extent that economic growth is affected by inequality, or vice versa,
poverty responsiveness also depends on inequality due to this latter link. Further, other factors
may determine the extent to which growth can affect poverty; we find that the level of develop-
ment and the initial level of inequality are good candidates to explain the different outcomes of
the growth process in terms of poverty reduction across the areas of the country.
To our knowledge this paper is the first to address these issues in the context of a developed
country. Already before the last economic crisis, concern for poverty dynamics in Italy received
renewed interest in the past years; several authors have pointed out the so-called “impoverish-
ment” of the Italian households (Boeri and Brandolini, 2004; Massari et al., 2009). We offer a new
look at poverty dynamics to ascertain how far they have been influenced by growth and inequal-
ity changes and to provide further evidence on the dualist structure of the country and on the
trap mechanism behind the underdevelopment of the southern Italian regions. To this end we use
the “Survey on Household Income and Wealth” (SHIW) of the Bank of Italy drawn up between
1977 and 2004 across the 20 Italian administrative regions to evaluate the extent by which eco-
nomic growth has contributed to poverty reduction and the degree by which poverty rates have
responded to inequality changes as well.
The paper is organized as follows. The second section introduces to the idea of pro-poor
growth; it follows summarizing the statistical foundations of the income and the inequality elas-
ticities of poverty under the assumption that incomes are lognormally distributed. Section 3 de-
scribes the data and illustrates the main trends in poverty rates, inequality index and growth
indicators. Section 4 discusses the methodology used to compute the growth incidence curves
and develop the parametric estimations of the income and the inequality elasticities. After the
description of the results in section five, the last section concludes.
2 Pro-poor growth and poverty elasticities
As Besley and Burgess (2003) point out, the link between economic growth and poverty is ulti-
mately a matter of quantification, which can be performed through the estimation of the elastici-
2
ties of poverty with respect to growth and inequality2. This empirical strategy stems from, and is
connected to, the diffusion of the idea of “pro-poor” growth. Growth is defined as pro-poor if it
results in higher growth rates for the poor than the non-poor; broadly, growth should be biased
toward the poor regardless of its impact on the reduction of poverty levels. Even though the no-
tion of pro-poor growth is still debated (Araar et al., 2009; Chen and Ravallion, 2003; Duclos, 2009;
Essama-Nssah and Lambert, 2009; Kakwani and Pernia, 2000; Klasen, 2008; Son, 2004), much ef-
fort has been put into trying to narrow it into broadly different definitions, such as absolute versus
relative definitions or, further, weak versus strong ones. Growth is defined as weakly pro-poor if it
reduces poverty, regardless of its extent and its degree. A growth process is hence called pro-poor,
even though the poor would receive a small fraction of the total benefits; a sufficient condition
for applying this definition is that the growth rate in income among the poor is greater than zero.
A deeper approach defines a process as pro-poor, depending on whether it has either a relative
or an absolute impact. The relative notion characterizes growth as pro-poor if the growth rate of
income of the poor exceeds the average income growth rate; growth needs to be relatively biased
toward the poor, with the latter having an income growth exceeding the average. This relative
view stems from the fact that growth, on top of reducing poverty rates, implies a reduction in
relative inequality. Growth is defined as absolute pro-poor if the absolute amount of the income
gain of the poor exceeds, or is equal to, that of non-poor; under this criterion absolute inequality
falls as a consequence of economic growth episodes.
Income and inequality elasticities of poverty can be properly estimated, once the empirical
distribution of income can be described by some known distribution. Formally, the proportion of
the population at time t with an income below the poverty line z (the headcount index) is equal to
the probability that income yt is lower than the poverty line:
hct = Pr(yt < z) ≡ Ft(z) (1)
where Ft(z) is the income distribution function.
Under the assumption that incomes are lognormally distributed (Aitchison and Brown, 1957;
Bourguignon, 2003; Epaulard, 2003; Kalwij and Verschoor, 2007; Lopez and Servén, 2006; Quah,
2003), this poverty measure may be expressed as
hct = Φ
(
log (z/µt)
σt
+
1
2
σt
)
(2)
where Φ (.) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution and σt
stands for the standard deviation of the logarithm of income. Under the lognormality assumption
there exists a one-to-one mapping between the Gini index and the Lorenz curve, and hence the
standard deviation. Let Gt be the Gini index at time t. It is verified that
2Early approaches based on accounting techniques (Datt and Ravallion, 1992; Kakwani, 1993) attempted to decom-
pose the rate of change of a poverty measure between two periods in growth and inequality components. For a review
see Bourguignon (2003).
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Gt = 2Φ
(
σt√
2
)
− 1 (3)
Poverty reduction at a given point of time can be fully determined by the growth rate of the mean
income of the population and by the change in income distribution. For sufficiently small changes,
a change over time in the poverty rate can be decomposed into an income and an inequality effect;
a first-order approximation of the decomposition results in
dhct
dt
=
∂hct
∂µt
dµt
dt
+
∂hct
∂Gt
dGt
dt
(4)
that in terms of elasticity can be expressed by
dhct
dt
= η
dµt
dt
hct
µt
+ γ
dGt
dt
hct
Gt
(5)
where η and γ are respectively the income and inequality elasticities of poverty and represent the
direct effects of growth and inequality changes on poverty reduction. Other indirect effects may
influence poverty movements over time. The initial level of inequality and the level of develop-
ment, for which the ratio of poverty line over mean income is used as a proxy3 (Bourguignon,
2003; Epaulard, 2003; Kalwij and Verschoor, 2007), seem good candidates to indirectly explain
why poverty rates respond differently to income and inequality changes. From (2) the income
elasticity of poverty may be derived as follows
η =
∂hct
∂µt
µt
hct
≡ − 1
σt
φ
(
log(z/µt)
σt
+ 12σt
)
Φ
(
log(z/µt)
σt
+ 12σt
) ≤ 0 (6)
where φ and Φ are, respectively, the probability and cumulative distribution functions of the stan-
dard normal distribution. The income elasticity is negative and decreasing, in absolute terms, in
the ratio of poverty line over mean income (z/µt) and the standard deviation of log-income (σt).
Similarly, using the standard deviation σt as a measure of inequality, the inequality elasticity
of poverty is derived as
γσ =
∂hct
∂σt
σt
hct
≡
φ
(
log(z/µt)
σt
+ 12σt
)
Φ
(
log(z/µt)
σt
+ 12σt
) (− log (z/µt)
σt
+
1
2
σt
)
≥ 0 (7)
Using the Gini index as an inequality measure, the inequality elasticity of poverty rate results
from (3) and (7) as
γG = γσ
∂σt
∂Gt
Gt
σt
(8)
The inequality elasticity is positive unless average income is very low, negatively correlated to the
3This ratio is used as an indicator for the inverse of the level of development.
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ratio of poverty line over mean income (z/µt) and to the standard deviation of log-income (σt).
3 Data
The data used are mainly from the Historical Archive of the “Survey on Household Income and
Wealth” (SHIW-HA) of the Bank of Italy. We employ the waves spanning the period between
1977 and 2004. The data are yearly until 1984, thereafter bi-annual (with a period of three years
between 1995 and 1998). The sample was maintained as much representative as possible; starting
in 1977 with 2915 households and 9598 individuals interviewed, the sample size was constantly
increased over time until 2004, when 8012 households and 20581 individuals were interviewed4.
The data are recorded by regions and areas (North, Centre and South/Islands)5. Regional GDP,
per-capita GDP and population share are drawn from the Data-base, based on regional accounts,
on the Italian Regions (March 2006 version) from the CRENoS centre (Centre for North South
Economic Research).
Though we acknowledge possible differences and drawbacks when choosing the relevant wel-
fare measure (Deaton, 2005), we employ the annually equivalent6 net disposable income of the
households as a welfare indicator. In Italy there are two main data sources for analyzing poverty
and distributional changes: the Household Consumption Survey (“Indagine sui Consumi delle
famiglie”) of the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) and the above-mentioned surveys of the
Bank of Italy. Since the former were placed under methodological revision during the 1990s, the
use of those data to carry out a longer period analysis may undermine the consistency of the
poverty measures. This ultimately induced our choice in favour of the income measure, as the
Historical Archive guarantees homogeneity in the survey data in spite of the changes in the ques-
tionnaires. Two definitions of household net disposable income are employed; one present since
1977 and the other which has only been available since 1987. The former (hereafter yn f a) includes
incomes from job earnings (employees and self-employed), imputed rents from owner-occupied
housing as well as social and pension transfers, but excludes yields on financial assets. The latter
(hereafter y f a) includes this last source of income net of interests on mortgages. Through most of
the analysis we employ the former indicator (yn f a) to exploit variation across more time periods;
in the final section we provide a robustness analysis which shows that the results are not sensitive
to the measure of income adopted7.
4The sample size has been increased only slightly until 1984, being maintained it around 1977 levels; in 1986, the
Institute strongly scaled up the sample size with 8022 households and 25068 individuals interviewed.
5The households are grouped across the 20 Italian administrative regions (hereafter referred to as regions), of which
only 19 are taken into account in the analysis, since data for the region Val d’Aosta are not available for many of the
survey years and hence are dropped from the dataset. Given the small size of the region in terms of geographical size,
income measures and population density, the final analysis is not affected by this deficiency. The regions are sorted into
the following areas: North: Piedmont, Lombardy, Trentino-Alto Adige, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Liguria, Emilia Romagna;
Centre: Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, Lazio; South/Islands: Abruzzi, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily,
Sardinia.
6As the reference unit is the household we employ an equivalence scale to allow the analysis to be implemented on
homogeneous units. Following most of the studies on poverty in Italy, we apply “Carbonaro’s equivalence scale”.
7Pairwise correlations between the two measures of disposable income over the years are the following: 1987: 0.9886;
5
The central issue for the identification of the poor is the definition of the poverty line, the main
distinction being made between absolute and relative. We use a pseudo-absolute poverty line,
defined as follows; after defining the relative poverty line in 1995 as the per-capita mean income
of a household of two components, we apply the national consumer price index (CPI, table A.1) to
scale this base poverty line over time8. The poor are those who have an equivalent income below
or equal to this standard.
Italian performance in terms of poverty reduction, inequality and growth reveals very con-
trasting features. Despite the impressive reduction in poverty rates, huge differentials still persist
across the three main areas of the country (i.e. North, Centre and South/Islands). Southern re-
gions are the poorest and the most unequal in the country, with still significantly high poverty
and inequality rates. Despite their appreciable development over the recent decades the central
regions have not yet caught up with the northern ones. The dualistic structure of the country
is therefore apparent as northern regions present lower poverty and inequality rates as well as
higher growth rates than the central and southern regions.
Figure 1: Estimated density functions, across time and areas
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The estimated density functions9 (figure 1) provide an overview for the whole country and for
its sub-areas for the years 1977, 1991 and 2004. Although the initial tendency towards the bimodal
national distribution becomes less apparent by the end of the period of analysis, important differ-
ences persist across the main areas. The distributions of the southern regions are wider than those
of the other regions and of the national ones as well as always behind the latter, confirming the
1989: 0.9616; 1991: 0.9789; 1993: 0.9701; 1995: 0.9840; 1998: 0.9713; 2000: 0.9744; 2002: 0.9945; 2004: 0.9973 .
8We use this approach since consistent and homogeneous absolute poverty lines are not available for the whole
period of analysis (i.e. 1977-2004); moreover, as regional price indices are not available for the considered periods we
are unable to estimate regional poverty lines. The benefit of this procedure is that the features of both the relative and
the absolute poverty lines are taken into account (Brandolini, 2005)
9We approximate the income distributions using a non-parametric kernel density function, using the Gaussian ker-
nel specification. The key parameter driving the fit of the kernel function is the bandwidth. Following a large litera-
ture (Cowell et al., 1998; Deaton, 1997; Pagan and Ullah, 1999; Quah, 2003; Sala-i-Martin, 2006) we use the bandwidth
h = 0.9 ∗min {sd, 0.75IQR} n−1/5, where sd is the standard deviation, IQR the interquartile range and n the number
of observations.
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higher poverty as well as inequality rates of the South with respect to both the country as a whole
and the other parts of it.
These trends are confirmed by the summary indices estimated from the surveys (tables 1-2
and figures A.1-A.2-A.3). The estimation procedure takes into account several issues to check the
robustness of the mean income, poverty and inequality statistics to the presence of outliers as well
as to the small sample size10, when regional measures are estimated (Cannari and D’Alessio, 2003;
Elbers et al., 2003; Ghosh and Rao, 1994; Tarozzi and Deaton, 2009; Wooldridge, 2002). Further,
we correct the standard errors of these estimates to take into account also the complex nature
of the sampling design11 (Biewen and Jenkins, 2006; Deaton, 1997). We estimate mean incomes
from the surveys for the two definitions described in the text (µyn f a and µy f a) and for each of these
definitions three measures of poverty (headcount - hcyn f a and hcy f a , poverty gap - pgyn f a and pgy f a ,
and squared poverty gap - spgyn f a and spgy f a) and one measure of inequality (Gini index - Gyn f a
and Gy f a)
12.
Poverty across Italian households has strikingly declined in the long run. The trend shows a
reversal at the beginning of the 1990s, when poverty rates slightly rose. Considerable differences
persist, however, among regions and areas. At the beginning of the period, the number of poor
households in the North was 25.4% of the total, compared to 32.4% in the Centre and 51.2% in the
South/Islands area; while the gap between North and Centre had vanished by 2004, the distance
between the latter two areas and the southern Italy remains marked. The higher rate at which
poverty fell in recent decades allowed the Centre to catch up with the northern regions by the end
of the period. In the South, instead, not only do poverty indices decrease at a much slower rate
than the other two areas, but poverty rates also slightly increased between 1991 and 2004. This
pattern is consistent across the three indices of poverty rates and it is respected independently of
the income definition used for their estimates.
Inequality follows the patterns of poverty, showing a decreasing trend until the beginning of
the 1990s and a remarkable increase in recent decades. Not only is the level of inequality strikingly
higher in the South throughout all the period, but also its dynamic is characterized by different
patterns; during the 1990s the Gini index shows quite a stable trend in the South, while being
much more volatile in the Centre. Low levels of inequality and more stability have characterized
the distribution of incomes in the northern regions; only between 2000 and 2004, did inequality
10Small area estimation issues as well as the presence of outliers can invalidate the inference due to unacceptably high
standard errors. The variability of our estimates is not high, ensuring that all the variables are statistically significant
and different from zero at 10% level of significance.
11The surveys are based on a two-stage sampling design, which is not a simple random one. In the first stage
municipalities - for which we do not have data - are randomly selected and stratified by region and population density.
In the second stage, the sample is selected from census lists of each municipality. Sampling weights provided by the
Bank of Italy were used to correct for this complex survey design and to take into account possible bias due to non-
response.
12The pairwise correlations between each of the measures estimated from the two different definitions of disposable
income is very high (table A.2). The difference in the two definitions of incomes comes from the presence of the yields
on the financial assets net of the interest on mortgages. In this regard, Paiella (2007) documents that Italian households
own little financial wealth and that most of the financial assets are strongly concentrated at the top of the income and
wealth distributions; furthermore, the capital gains enjoyed on these financial assets have been modest.
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in these regions strikingly increase, while during the 1990s it displayed only a slight increasing
trend.
4 Methodology
4.1 Growth incidence curve
Preliminarily, the impact of economic growth on poverty can be graphically examined through the
growth incidence curve (GIC). The GIC plots the growth rate of income (or consumption) for each
percentile of the distribution and allows us to look beyond averages at what happens to the poor,
the middle class and the non-poor during the growth process. It allows evaluation as to whether
growth is pro-poor, according to both its relative and absolute definitions. Following Ravallion
and Chen (2003), the mean growth rate for the poor13 is used as a measure of the rate of pro-poor
growth. Growth is called absolutely pro-poor if the mean growth rate for the poor is greater than
zero (“weak” approach) or relatively pro-poor if the mean growth rate for the poor is at least as
large as the growth rate in the overall mean. While the former criterion only requires the poor to
be on average better off in absolute terms, the idea of relative pro-poor growth requires the growth
process not to widen the initial income differentials.
Formally, at each time t the growth incidence curve maps out the mean growth rate for the
poor, used as a measure of pro-poor growth and defined by:
gt(p) =
L
′
t(p)
L′t−1(p)
(δ+ 1)− 1 (9)
where L′(p) is the slope of the Lorenz curve at the pth-quantile, at time t and t − 1, and δ =
(µt/µt−1)− 1 is the growth rate in mean income at time t. It is clear from (9) that if the Lorenz
curve does not change, if - in other words - there are no distributional effects of the growth process,
the rate of pro-poor growth corresponds to the growth rate in overall mean, in which case all
incomes grow at the same rate (gt(p) = δt, for each quantile p). gt(p) > δt if and only if yt(p)/µt
is increasing over time, where yt(p) is the income of the pth-quantile. Further, if g(p) is decreasing
(increasing) for all p, inequality falls (rises) over time. The absolute rate of pro-poor growth can
finally be computed as the area under the growth incidence curve up to the headcount index.
GIC curves were constructed from the SHIW-HA surveys14. Interpretation of the curve is
based on the definition provided above. If the GIC is above zero it indicates weak absolute pro-
poor growth. If the GIC is negatively sloped it indicates relative pro-poor growth, implying that
the poor benefit more than the non-poor from growth and that inequality between the two groups
drops.
13This measure differs from the growth rate in the mean income of the poor, generally used in the poverty literature.
14We trimmed the distributions at the 1st and the 99th percentiles and estimated confidence intervals using the
bootstrap technique to reduce the biases produced by the surveys that are known to be stronger at the extreme bounds
of the distributions.
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4.2 Econometric specification
In the econometric analysis we use the regional estimates of the mean incomes and of the poverty
and inequality rates; when we employ the first definition of household disposable income (i.e.
yn f a) we have 342 usable observations, spanning 18 time periods across 19 regions15. The avail-
ability of panel data makes it possible to control for unobserved time-constant region-specific char-
acteristics that may affect both poverty and income, i.e. regional fixed effects. One of the simplest
specifications used to estimate the basic relationship between poverty rates, economic growth and
inequality (Adams, 2004; Besley and Burgess, 2003; Ravallion and Chen, 1997) is given by:
log hcit = αi + η log µit + γ logGit + βt+ ε it (10)
where hcit is the headcount in region i at time t, µit the mean income derived from the survey, Git
the Gini index, αi the regional fixed-effects, t a common time trend, and ε it are the (idiosyncratic)
errors. We wash out the regional fixed effects by taking first differences from the model in eq. (10)
so as to estimate the following model16
∆ log hcit = β+ η∆ log µit + γ∆ logGit + υit (11)
where ∆ log hcit = log hcit − log hcit−1, ∆ log µit = log µit − log µit−1, ∆ logGit = logGit −
logGit−1 and t − 1 refers to the observations from the survey before time t17. The estimated co-
efficients give the (partial) elasticities of poverty with respect to income (η) and inequality (γ);
controlling for the changes in income distribution this simple model (eq. 11) allows identification
of the distribution-neutral income elasticity of poverty. Further we test the hypothesis that area
heterogeneity exists to evaluate whether structural differences between North, Centre and South
do affect poverty responses across regions and over time. Finally, following the model developed
in section 2 we ask whether the regional variation in poverty responsiveness to income and in-
equality changes is due to the initial level of development and to the initial level of inequality.
To this end we estimate a more detailed model (eq. 12), introducing the density near the poverty
line at the beginning of the spell - captured by the ratio of the poverty line over the mean income
(log (zt−1/µit−1)) - as a proxy for the initial level of development and the level of the Gini index at
the beginning of the spell (logGit−1). Their interactions with both the changes in mean income
and the changes in inequality capture the effects that the “crowdedness” near the poverty line as
well as the characteristics of the initial distribution have on the degree of reaction of the poverty
15Throughout the analysis we use this definition as it allows us to exploit variations across many time periods. In the
final section we conduct a robustness check employing the variables derived from the second definition of household
disposable income (i.e. y f a). In the latter case, we have 171 usable observations, spanning 9 time periods across 19
regions.
16We prefer the first difference with respect to the fixed effect estimator since the latter would require stronger as-
sumptions for consistency on the correlation between the explanatory and the time-varying omitted variables. As
further discussed in the text, these assumptions may be implausible in our setting.
17Hereafter we define the time-distance between two surveys as a “spell”. Hence, the first differences in models (11)
and (12) are the (log) differences between the observations derived from two consecutive surveys.
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changes with respect to both income and inequality changes (Bourguignon, 2003; Epaulard, 2003;
Kalwij and Verschoor, 2007).
∆ log hcit = β+ [η1 + η2 logGit−1 + η3 log (zt−1/µit−1)]∆ log µit+
+ [γ1 + γ2 logGit−1 + γ3 log (zt−1/µit−1)]∆ logGit+
+ ξ logGit−1 + χ log (zt−1/µit−1) + υit (12)
The OLS estimates of the models in (11) and (12) are likely to be biased and inconsistent due
to the correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term. We do not observe the
true values of the mean incomes, poverty and inequality rates, but we estimated them with some
error18; taking first differences in eq. (10) introduces more structure in the error term. Firstly, the
latter is correlated within regions and over time since consecutive spells for a given region are
not statistically independent as they have one survey in common; we deal with this issue, cor-
recting the variance-covariance matrix by clustering the standard errors at regional level. Another
source of correlation derives from the fact that mean incomes, poverty and inequality rates are
estimated from the same surveys; the new error term (υit) is hence likely to be correlated with the
measurement error in mean income19. We employ a Generalized Method of Moments estimator
to deal with these endogeneity issues to have consistent estimations of the coefficients. Follow-
ing the literature (Kalwij and Verschoor, 2007; Ravallion, 2001; Ravallion and Chen, 1997), we use
lagged values of the mean income and the change in the per-capita GDP (∆ logGDPpcit) as in-
struments for the change in the mean income (∆ log µit) as well as interaction terms between these
instruments and the proxies of the initial level of the development and of the initial distribution.
Other instruments include lagged values of the Gini index, the change in the size of the popula-
tion (∆ log popit) as well as its value at the beginning of the spell (log popit−1)20. As the poverty
rates derive from the surveys, while regional per-capita GDP from the regional accounts, it can
be safely assumed that the measurement errors in the former are not correlated with the latter.
These instruments accomplish the two specification conditions required; they are both relevant
and orthogonal to the error structure. The latter condition is tested through the overidentifying
restrictions test, or Hansen-J test, which is the key test to assess both the validity of the model and
the exogeneity of the instruments. The second requirement is that the instruments are relevant,
that is correlated with the endogenous regressor and with good explanatory power. Apart from
being correlated with the regressor the consequence of instruments with little explanatory power
18Above we reported that this error is very small as the variability of our variables is very tiny.
19The OLS bias is composed by the classical attenuation bias due to measurement error in the explanatory variable
and by the common-survey bias due to lower participation rates in the surveys among the richer groups than among
the poorer ones, which would lead to over-estimation of poverty rates and under-estimations of the incomes (Deaton,
2005; Ravallion and Chen, 1997).
20Theoretical arguments within the unified growth approach may justify the use of both the changes and the initial
level of the population to map changes in mean incomes as well as the level of development, but not the changes in the
poverty rates (see for instance Galor, 2010; Galor and Weil, 2000).
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(weak instruments) is increased bias in the estimated coefficients, reducing the efficiency of the
estimator21.
The coefficients estimated in the last model (eq. 12) no longer map the poverty elasticities with
respect to income and inequality; the latter can be predicted from the estimated parameters as
ηˆ = ηˆ1 + ηˆ2 logGit−1 + ηˆ3 log (zt−1/µit−1) (13)
and
γˆ = γˆ1 + γˆ2 logGit−1 + γˆ3 log (zt−1/µit−1) (14)
As stated in section 2, the predicted income (ηˆ, eq. 13) and inequality (γˆ, eq. 14) elasticities of
poverty differ across regions and over time depending on the initial distribution of income and on
the initial level of development.
5 Results
5.1 Pro-poor growth and the growth incidence curve
Economic growth produced heterogeneous effects across the main areas of the country and over
the periods (figure 2). In the long run (1977-2004) growth was weakly pro-poor as the GIC is al-
ways above zero, such that even the poorest benefited from growth episodes. It cannot be defini-
tively stated that growth was pro-poor in relative terms as well, since the growth incidence curve
is not monotonically decreasing: it shows a reversal around the 55th percentile, but not a decreas-
ing trend in the lowest part of the distribution22.
Overall, the poor have benefited proportionally more than the non-poor in the long run. Nonethe-
less, the distribution of gains from growth seems to have been biased in favour of the middle -
especially the upper-middle - class rather than the poorest parts of the distribution. As growth
rates were almost constant between the 20th and the 50th percentiles, the poor and the middle
class benefited equally from growth episodes; growth was not pro-poor in relative terms since it
was not positively biased towards the poorest part of the distribution. The decreasing trend in the
final part of the distribution clearly shows that growth favoured the upper-middle class with re-
spect to the richest part of the population. Overall, growth positively favoured poverty reduction
with two distinct distributional effects. The gap between the lowest part of the population and the
middle class increased over time, whereas the distance between the upper-middle class and the
richest part narrows.
21Unreported first stage regressions show that both the significance and magnitude of their coefficients as well as the
size of the partial R-squared and the F-tests can confirm about the power of the instruments.
22First and second order dominance criteria may be easily applied to judge the robustness of these results (see Araar
et al., 2009; Duclos, 2009; Essama-Nssah and Lambert, 2009)
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Figure 2: Growth incidence curves, national analysis
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The national picture is not coupled by homogeneous trends at regional level (figure A.4); in the
long run (1977-2004), economic growth favoured much more the poor in the northern and central
regions than those in southern regions, implying a stronger decrease in the poverty and inequality
rates in the former regions than in the latter. The faster reduction in poverty and inequality rates
in the North and in the Centre with respect to the South depends only in part on the differentials
of growth rates between the three areas and among the regions within these areas; an important
part should also be attached to the different trends in the distribution of incomes. In this regard,
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the Italian dualistic structure is confirmed not only in terms of macro and aggregate indicators but
also with regard to the individual distribution of incomes. Over time, gains from economic growth
have followed a strikingly heterogeneous pattern both at national and regional level. Until the
beginning of the 1990s, economic growth drove the very strong rate of poverty reduction as both
the growth incidence curve was monotonically decreasing and most of the mean growth rates for
the poor were higher than the average growth rate. This trend suggests that growth was pro-poor
in absolute as well as relative terms over this period, implying a reduction of inequality between
the lowest and highest part of the distribution. In the following decades, instead, economic growth
was strongly against the poor; the annual growth rate for the poor was lower than the average
growth rate for almost all of the percentiles and the upward slope of the curve suggests that the
distribution of gains from the growth process is unequal, favouring the upper income classes23.
Briefly, while the big reduction in poverty achieved in the first years of the sample was driven by
patterns of growth not biased against the poor, the renewed increase in poverty rates in the last
few decades may be explained not only by slight rates of changes in mean income, but also, or at
least in part, by pattern of growth biased against the poor part of the distribution and in favour of
the richest one.
5.2 Income and inequality elasticities of poverty: baseline model
Table 3 presents the results of the baseline model (eq. 11), which estimates the gross and distribution-
neutral income elasticities of poverty. The main assumption behind the consistency of the pa-
rameters in the GMM estimations is that the instruments are orthogonal to the error terms. The
overidentifying restrictions - or Hansen-J - statistic tests the joint hypothesis of the correct model
specification and the orthogonality conditions; its low significance (high p-values) ensures that
the instruments are actually not correlated with the errors.
The coefficients are highly significant and with the expected signs; changes in poverty rates
are negatively correlated with income changes and positively with changes in inequality. A 1%
increase in the mean income reduces poverty rates by around 2% (column 4), while a 1% increase
in inequality will increase them by 1.5%. We explore the possibility that inter-area differences
exist in the elasticities of poverty by including a complete set of area dummies (columns 5-8). The
F-test on the equality of these elasticities across the areas confirms that the three parameters are
different and that there exists substantial variation across North, Centre and South. Poverty rates
in the North and in the Centre are more reactive to growth than in the South; in the North and
Centre a 1% increase in survey mean incomes implies a 3.4% reduction in the headcount, while in
the South the decrease is 2.5%. In all three areas, poverty changes are very responsive to inequality
changes as well, with a 1% increase in inequality implying a 1.9% increase in poverty rates.
23The slopes of the growth incidence curves change sharply around 1991 and 1993. Up to 1991 they were mono-
tonically decreasing both at national level and across the whole country: that year there had been a marked change,
more pronounced in the South than in the other areas, expressed by a monotonically increasing pattern. Unreported
estimations between each pair of available years confirm that the sharp change in the distributions of the gains from
economic growth starts at the onset of the economic crisis of the 1990s which the country faced.
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The gross income elasticity (columns 1-2 and 5-6) picks up changes in inequality coinciding
with growth; controlling for these changes (columns 3-4 and 7-8) the distribution-neutral income
elasticities (η - section 2) are revised, taking into account the role that distributional movements
have on poverty rates, both directly and indirectly through the growth channel. The coefficient is
quite stable in the first specification (columns 2 and 4); otherwise, when we allow for area hetero-
geneity the coefficients of the distribution-neutral income elasticities (column 8) are higher than
the “gross” ones (column 6). Especially in the South, where inequality rates are much higher than
those in the other regions of the country, the responsiveness of poverty rates to economic growth
would have been much higher after washing out the effects of the changes in the distribution.
The inequality elasticity of poverty remains substantially stable across the methods of estimation,
while the income elasticity of poverty is further corrected by the GMM estimation.
5.3 Level of development and initial inequality
Table 4 provides the estimates of the more detailed model (eq. 12), where we enquire whether the
level of development and the initial level of inequality may be the source for the observed het-
erogeneity in the income elasticities of poverty across North, Centre and South. We find that this
heterogeneity is not due to different degrees of responsiveness of the poverty rates to economic
growth, but depends on the differences in the initial level of development and in the initial level
of inequality across the regions. In the first specification we allow for area heterogeneity includ-
ing a full set of dummy variables (columns 1 and 2); all the coefficients are highly significant, but
we can no longer reject the hypothesis of equality of the coefficients across the areas (column 2).
Hence we estimate our final model (column 3 and 4) where the income and the inequality elastic-
ities of poverty are allowed to differ across regions only as a function of their initial conditions,
as described by the interaction terms. The coefficients on the change in mean income (∆ log µit)
and on the change in the Gini index (∆ logGit) are no longer interpretable as “net” elasticities; the
presence of the interaction terms implies that these elasticities must now reflect also the influence
of the initial level of inequality and the initial level of development. As expected (section 2), both
initial lower level of development and initial higher level of inequality tend to correct downward
the estimates of the income and the inequality elasticities of poverty (column 4).
In order to have an overview of the heterogeneity in the estimated elasticities across regions
and over time, table 5 presents the predicted income and inequality elasticities of poverty (eq. 13
and 14). In the overall period (1977-2004), more equal and more developed regions (i.e. North)
show higher income and inequality elasticities of poverty with respect to the more unequal and
the less developed ones (column 1). We further analyze the change in elasticities over different
sub-periods. The increasing magnitude of elasticities over the years cannot be an indicator of also
an improvement in poverty reduction policies, since it is mainly due to the fact that as poverty
rates decrease over time, the elasticities are automatically over-inflated.
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Table 4: Income and inequality elasticities: the role of initial conditions
OLS GMM OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-2.471** -4.388***
(1.043) (0.558)
-1.301*  -3.175*** -1.153 -3.282***
(0.763) (0.402) (0.774) (0.374)
2.470*** 2.514*** 3.915*** 4.463***
(0.670) (0.714) (0.521) (0.623)
2.530*** 2.114*** 2.744*** 2.829***
(0.655) (0.337) (0.664) (0.403)
1.814*** 1.495*** 2.022*** 2.210***
(0.493) (0.236) (0.498) (0.325)
-3.332*** -3.281*** -3.348*** -3.695***
(0.434) (0.302) (0.444) (0.395)
0.281** 0.285*** 0.275*  0.335***
(0.138) (0.033) (0.141) (0.056)
-0.025 -0.067*  -0.038 -0.114** 
(0.073) (0.036) (0.075) (0.052)
North -4.301*** -5.679***
(1.154) (0.728)
Centre -2.978*** -5.241***
(1.142) (0.725)
South -2.920*** -4.617***
(1.031) (0.599)
323 323 323 323
0.67 0.58 0.65 0.63
(0.271) (0.349)
2.62
Dependent variable: 
Explanatory variables 
(Standard errors)
# Obs.
R-squared
Hansen J-statistics
(p-value)
13.347a 10.022b
Equality income elasticity 
across areas (F-test)c
 log hcit
 logit
 logGit
 logit∗area dummy
variables
 logit∗logGit−1
 logit∗log zt−1/ it−1
 logGit∗logGit−1
 logGit∗log zt−1 /it−1
logGit−1
log zt−1/it−1
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered at regional level in parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%.
a Instruments: ∆ logGDPpcit and log µit−1 interacted with area dummy variables, ∆GDPpcit ∗ logGit−1, ∆GDPpcit ∗
log (zt−1/µit−1), log µit−1 ∗ logGit−1, log µit−1 ∗ log (zt−1/µit−1), logGit−1 ∗ logGit−1, ∆ log popit, log popit−1, ∆ log popit ∗
logGit−1, ∆ log popit ∗ log (zt−1/µit−1), log popit−1 ∗ logGit−1, log popit−1 ∗ log (zt−1/µit−1)
b Instruments: ∆ logGDPpcit, log µit−1, ∆GDPpcit ∗ logGit−1, ∆GDPpcit ∗ log (zt−1/µit−1), log µit−1 ∗ logGit−1,
log µit−1 ∗ log (zt−1/µit−1), logGit−1 ∗ logGit−1, ∆ log popit, log popit−1, ∆ log popit ∗ logGit−1, ∆ log popit ∗ log (zt−1/µit−1),
log popit−1 ∗ logGit−1, log popit−1 ∗ log (zt−1/µit−1)
c F-statistics critical value (5%): 3.00
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Table 5: Predicted elasticities
1977-2004 80s 90s 00s 80s-90s 80s-00s 90s-00s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
National -2.869 -2.490 -3.336 -3.803 0.340 0.527 0.140(0.188) (0.191) (0.180) (0.237)
North -3.527 -2.988 -4.053 -4.725 0.356 0.581 0.166(0.171) (0.251) (0.127) (0.155)
Centre -3.222 -3.013 -3.596 -4.177 0.193 0.386 0.162(0.316) (0.342) (0.277) (0.317)
South -2.116 -1.793 -2.578 -2.810 0.438 0.567 0.090(0.136) (0.130) (0.106) (0.192)
National 2.207 1.898 2.601 2.973 0.370 0.566 0.143(0.155) (0.155) (0.151) (0.197)
North 2.762 2.324 3.207 3.747 0.380 0.612 0.169(0.136) (0.196) (0.102) (0.119)
Centre 2.510 2.323 2.841 3.308 0.223 0.424 0.165(0.242) (0.267) (0.205) (0.236)
South 1.569 1.312 1.950 2.127 0.486 0.621 0.091(0.109) (0.099) (0.088) (0.153)
Mean over the period Rate of change (%)
Income elasticity of poverty
Inequality elasticity of poverty
Note: standard errors in parentheses. 80s = 1980-1989; 90s = 1991-1998; 00s = 2000-2004
Indeed, when we pay attention to their relative importance and look at the rate of change
over the decades, over the years the inequality elasticities increase much more than the income
elasticities of poverty. For instance, between the 1980s and the initial part of the 2000s, at national
level the inequality elasticity of poverty increased by 56.6% while the income elasticity of poverty
only by 52.7%, implying an increasing weight of lower inequality than only higher income growth
rates in reducing poverty rates.
5.4 Robustness analysis
5.4.1 Poverty measures
The model developed in section 2 poses a direct relation between economic growth, inequality
and the number of poor, as expressed by the headcount index. Nonetheless, we provide further
evidence with the adoption of alternative poverty measures; namely, the poverty gap and the
squared poverty gap which are indicators of the depth and of the severity of poverty among the
poor.
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Table 6 presents the results, using as the dependent variables the changes in the other two
poverty measures (∆ log pgit = log pgit − log pgit−1 and ∆ log spgit = log spgit − log spgit−1) be-
tween two consecutive surveys. The size of the estimated coefficients is slightly higher than that
in the previous models due to the higher sensitivity of the two poverty measures; differently from
the headcount, the poverty and the squared poverty gap are much more elastic to transfers be-
tween the poor as they identify respectively the distance of the average income of the poor from
the poverty line and the inequality amongst the poor. Nonetheless, the predicted elasticities (table
A.3) are consistent and in line with those estimated in the previous model. Higher inequality and
a lower of level of development lessen both the income and the inequality elasticities of poverty,
inducing striking variations across regions and over time also in the sensitivity of the changes in
the depth and intensity of poverty to the changes in mean incomes and inequality. Southern re-
gions are the less sensitive to economic growth and to inequality changes in reducing not only the
number of the poor, but also the intensity of poverty.
5.4.2 Longer spells
Economic growth and changes in distribution may well affect the reduction of poverty rates only
in the very the long run. To verify this possibility, we check the robustness of the previous results
to the adoption of longer spells. Instead of having spells defined as the (log) differences between
two consecutive surveys, now the length of the spells is given by the distance τ = 1, 2, 3, 5, 10
between two surveys. The changes in the variables of interest are defined as ∆ log xit ≡ log xit −
log xit−τ, with x = hc, µ,G; similarly, the interaction terms refer to the beginning of the τ-th spell.
Table 7 shows that the coefficients estimated are strikingly in line with those estimated in the
previous models (see tables 3 and 4); increasing the length of the spell does not substantially
alter either the size or significance of estimates, implying that the elasticities previously identified
actually map the degrees of responsiveness of the poverty rates to changes in mean income and
distribution.
In all the specifications, the more detailed models (columns 3-4, 7-8, 11-12 and 15-16) return
highly significant coefficients which provide predicted elasticities strikingly consistent with those
estimated in the shorter run version. The simpler specifications (columns 1-2, 5-6, 9-10, 13-14)
return the distribution-neutral income elasticities of poverty which are very much in line with the
previous ones, except in the longer spell case (τ = 10, column 14). This may be due to the fact that
on increasing the length of the spells the reduced number of observations influences the efficiency
of the GMM estimation, while not affecting the OLS estimator. Table A.4 in the appendix presents
an overview of the heterogeneity in the predicted elasticities across regions and over time. These
are very close to the elasticities in the shorter spell case (τ = 1). It is further confirmed that they
are very sensitive to the initial conditions even in the long run; underdeveloped and unequal
regions present lower income and inequality elasticities of poverty. In this regard, a poverty trap
mechanism seems at work in the southern regions of Italy as their continuously lower degrees of
responsiveness of the poverty rates to economic growth and to changes in distribution are caused
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by their initial low level of development and by their initial high level of inequality, and not only
by their lower growth rates of the mean incomes24. This is especially evident when considering
that over the years the poverty rates have become more elastic to changes in distribution than
to changes in mean income. Table A.4 indeed confirms that over time the inequality elasticity
of poverty proved to be relatively higher than the income elasticity as the rate of change of the
former increased across the decades much more than the latter (columns 5-6-7).
5.4.3 Income definitions
Thus far the analysis has employed only one definition of household equivalent disposable income
both for the semiparametric estimation of the growth incidence curves and for the parametric es-
timation of the poverty elasticities. It may be alleged that this measure of income (yn f a), which
excludes the yields on financial assets, overestimates the poverty rates since financial assets can
be an important device either for coping with the risk associated to higher poverty environments
or an important source of wealth accumulation. We have already verified that there are small dif-
ferences between the two measures of income, given the very high pairwise correlations between
them (see footnote 7) and between the variables estimated from the two different measures of
income (table A.2).
Figure 3 plots the growth incidence curve for both the definitions of income between the first
year in which the financial assets source entered the survey (1987) and the last year of our sample
(2004); panel 3a plots the estimated curve using the first definition of income (yn f a) which does
not take into account the yields on the financial assets, while panel 3b plots the curve for the other
income measure (y f a) which instead includes this source as well.
As expected, the inclusion of financial assets does not influence the analysis; the slopes of the
curves in the two cases are almost equal and slightly increasing at national level, indicating that -
as previously shown (see figures 2 and A.4) - since the early 1990s the distributional process has
been against the poorest parts of the distribution as the lowest percentiles gained much less than
the middle and upper ones. This features is more evident in the southern regions than in north
and centre. In the latter, the fairly flat curves are evidence that households across almost all the
percentiles experienced the same mean growth rate of incomes; even in these cases, however, the
growth process has not been pro-poor since there has not been a process of convergence between
the upper and lower tails of the distribution. Neither does the inclusion of financial assets affect
the size of the mean growth rates across the percentiles which is equivalent across the income
measures used.
24Heterogeneity in the growth rates of the mean incomes and of the per-capita GDP cannot fully explain the hetero-
geneity in the poverty elasticities since over the whole sample southern regions do not show persistently lower growth
rates than northern ones (table 2).
23
Figure 3: Growth incidence curves: robustness check
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(b) Including financial incomes (y f a)
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Table 8 presents estimates of the income and inequality elasticities of poverty; in panel A we
report the estimates based on the first indicator of income (yn f a), but over a shorter period of
time with respect to the previous analysis for consistency with the available observations when a
full measure of household disposable income is used (y f a, panel B). In both cases, the distribution-
neutral income elasticity of poverty and the inequality elasticity of poverty (columns 1-2, 5-6, 9-10)
are slightly higher than those in the previous specifications (tables 3, 4 and 7) as a consequence
of both the shorter period of time and of the fact that as poverty rates decrease over time small
changes in mean income or in distribution inflate the elasticities. Nonetheless, in the more detailed
specifications (columns 3-4, 7-8, 11-12) the estimated coefficients can predict elasticities very close
to those found before, even when we control for longer spells. Table A.5 in the appendix shows
that the size of the elasticities is generally consistent with those previously estimated, although
the elasticities estimated in the model based on the measure of income y f a are slightly higher than
those from the model based on the income yn f a.
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6 Conclusion
This paper assessed poverty sensitivity to growth and distributional changes in Italy, across its
regions and over the period between 1977 and 2004. The growth incidence curves highlight inter-
esting features of the Italian growth process. In the long run, between 1977 and 2004, growth was
pro-poor under the weak absolute definition, positively favouring poverty reduction. Nonethe-
less, distribution of the gains of economic growth seems to have been biased in favour of the
upper-middle class, suggesting that economic growth was not pro-poor in relative terms. While
the gap between the lowest part of the population and the middle class has increased over time,
the distance between the upper-middle class and the richest part narrows. Until the early 1990s,
growth strikingly drove the reduction in poverty rates as the growth incidence curve was mono-
tonically decreasing and most of the mean growth rates for the poor were higher than the average
growth rate. In the last fifteen years this pattern has dramatically changed: not only is the annual
growth rate for the poor lower than the growth rate in mean across almost all of the percentiles,
but also the upward slope of the curve suggests that the distribution of gains has been unequal,
favouring the upper income classes. The renewed increase in poverty may be explained not only
by slight rates of changes in mean income, but also, or at least in part, by growth patterns biased
against the poor part of the distribution and in favour of the wealthiest. At regional level, while
in the north and centre economic growth has largely favoured the poorest part of the distribution,
in the South it has been more biased in favour of the richest and of the upper-middle parts of the
distribution.
Income and inequality elasticities of poverty have been estimated to analyze the rate at which
poverty rates respond to growth episodes and distributional changes. Overall, poverty across Ital-
ian regions is highly sensitive to both growth and distributional changes: a 1% increase in survey
mean incomes reduces the headcount index by about 2.8%, while a 1% reduction in inequality
implies a reduction by about 2.2%. The differentials in the poverty elasticities between areas can
be due not to the heterogeneity in the degrees of sensitivity, but to the initial conditions of in-
equality and level of development; a higher initial level of inequality and lower initial level of
development lead to lower income and inequality elasticities of poverty such that the northern
and central regions respond more elastically to a change in survey mean incomes (respectively
-3.527% and -3.222%) than the southern part of the country (-2.116%) as well as to a change in
distribution (2.762% and 2.510% in the former against 1.569% in the latter regions).
Growth-oriented policies have undoubtedly favoured the strong reduction in poverty rates
across the Italian regions. However, the strong weight that distributional changes have in shaping
these trends can strikingly explain the differentials between and within the three areas as well as
the persistent and considerable lag in large parts of the country.
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Appendix
Figure A.1: Regional poverty rates
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Note: estimations based on the two definitions of household disposable income, Yn f a and Yf a.
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Figure A.2: Regional inequality
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Figure A.3: Regional mean income and per-capita GDP
10
00
0
20
00
0
30
00
0
40
00
0
19
77
19
80
19
83
19
86
19
89
19
92
19
95
19
98
20
01
20
04
19
77
19
80
19
83
19
86
19
89
19
92
19
95
19
98
20
01
20
04
19
77
19
80
19
83
19
86
19
89
19
92
19
95
19
98
20
01
20
04
North Centre South/Island
regional mean income (Y_nfa) regional mean income (Y_fa) regional per−capita GDP
year
Note: annual mean household equivalent disposable incomes, Yn f a and Yf a, estimated from SHIW-HA; per-capita GDP
from CRENoS. Both are in euros (€) at 1995 prices.
29
Figure A.4: Growth incidence curves, across regions and periods
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Table A.1: Poverty lines
Year CPI Poverty line (yn f a) Poverty line (y f a)
1977 19.99 1665.735
1978 22.42 1874.999
1979 25.74 2151.226
1980 31.19 2611.605
1981 36.74 3071.985
1982 42.79 3582.587
1983 49.06 4109.93
1984 54.36 4545.198
1986 62.86 5265.063
1987 65.83 5507.809 5711.38
1989 73.48 6143.969 6379.73
1991 83.24 6964.281 7221.68
1993 91.38 7642.294 7933.44
1995 100 8370.753 8679.91
1998 108.1 9048.543 9382.98
2000 112.7 9433.587 9782.26
2002 118.8 9944.189 10311.73
2004 124.5 10505.02 10806.48
Note: poverty lines from author’s calculation on SHIW-HA, in euros (€); CPI from the National Institute of Statistics
(ISTAT).
Table A.2: Bivariate correlations
µyn f a µy f a hcyn f a hcy f a pgyn f a pgy f a spgyn f a spgy f a Gyn f a Gy f a
µyn f a 1
µy f a 0.994 1
hcyn f a -0.823 -0.834 1
hcy f a -0.821 -0.834 0.995 1
pgyn f a -0.750 -0.760 0.937 0.925 1
pgy f a -0.760 -0.771 0.946 0.938 0.998 1
spgyn f a -0.637 -0.640 0.794 0.779 0.931 0.920 1
spgy f a -0.648 -0.653 0.796 0.785 0.921 0.918 0.968 1
Gyn f a -0.097 -0.108 0.493 0.484 0.566 0.561 0.505 0.495 1
Gy f a -0.041 -0.030 0.413 0.404 0.494 0.488 0.459 0.445 0.967 1
31
Table A.3: Predicted elasticities: other poverty measures
1977-2004 80s 90s 00s 80s-90s 80s-00s 90s-00s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
National -2.667 -2.350 -2.935 -3.413 0.249 0.452 0.163(0.158) (0.191) (0.146) (0.203)
North -3.048 -2.581 -3.341 -3.969 0.295 0.538 0.188(0.174) (0.303) (0.144) (0.214)
Centre -2.819 -2.804 -2.891 -3.441 0.031 0.227 0.190(0.412) (0.418) (0.435) (0.492)
South -2.258 -1.922 -2.601 -2.913 0.353 0.515 0.120(0.189) (0.219) (0.155) (0.262)
National 2.484 2.148 2.913 3.317 0.356 0.544 0.139(0.169) (0.168) (0.164) (0.215)
North 3.089 2.613 3.574 4.162 0.368 0.593 0.164(0.148) (0.212) (0.111) (0.129)
Centre 2.815 2.610 3.177 3.685 0.217 0.412 0.160(0.262) (0.290) (0.221) (0.256)
South 1.788 1.510 2.203 2.394 0.460 0.586 0.087(0.118) (0.107) (0.096) (0.167)
National -2.914 -2.594 -3.107 -3.642 0.197 0.404 0.172(0.179) (0.228) (0.175) (0.240)
North -3.191 -2.710 -3.395 -4.068 0.253 0.501 0.198(0.197) (0.368) (0.181) (0.277)
Centre -2.977 -3.062 -2.899 -3.493 -0.053 0.141 0.205(0.509) (0.514) (0.568) (0.645)
South -2.640 -2.260 -2.958 -3.345 0.309 0.480 0.131(0.259) (0.304) (0.227) (0.357)
National 2.578 2.269 2.940 3.334 0.296 0.469 0.134(0.151) (0.157) (0.142) (0.190)
North 3.089 2.648 3.496 4.053 0.320 0.531 0.159(0.143) (0.217) (0.107) (0.136)
Centre 2.844 2.698 3.114 3.597 0.154 0.333 0.155(0.278) (0.296) (0.254) (0.289)
South 1.997 1.724 2.367 2.573 0.373 0.493 0.087(0.116) (0.118) (0.088) (0.164)
Mean over the period Rate of change (%)
Panel A: Poverty Gap
Income elasticity of poverty
Inequality elasticity of poverty
Panel B: Squared Poverty Gap
Income elasticity of poverty
Inequality elasticity of poverty
Note: standard errors in parenthesis. 80s = 1980-1989; 90s = 1991-1998; 00s = 2000-2004
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Table A.4: Predicted elasticities: longer spells
1977-2004 80s 90s 00s 80s-90s 80s-00s 90s-00s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
National -2.544 -2.251 -2.791 -3.168 0.240 0.408 0.135(0.137) (0.154) (0.132) (0.163)
North -2.979 -2.549 -3.286 -3.779 0.289 0.483 0.150(0.138) (0.243) (0.104) (0.116)
Centre -2.774 -2.660 -2.874 -3.315 0.081 0.246 0.153(0.278) (0.262) (0.275) (0.307)
South -2.048 -1.785 -2.316 -2.561 0.297 0.435 0.106(0.122) (0.149) (0.112) (0.153)
National 2.254 1.971 2.540 2.820 0.288 0.430 0.110(0.131) (0.135) (0.129) (0.160)
North 2.712 2.310 3.052 3.456 0.321 0.496 0.132(0.118) (0.187) (0.100) (0.087)
Centre 2.511 2.336 2.712 3.064 0.161 0.312 0.130(0.211) (0.214) (0.190) (0.207)
South 1.726 1.493 2.005 2.141 0.343 0.434 0.068(0.098) (0.108) (0.088) (0.125)
National -3.281 -2.959 -3.482 -3.873 0.177 0.309 0.112(0.155) (0.162) (0.153) (0.182)
North -3.818 -3.421 -4.051 -4.566 0.184 0.335 0.127(0.140) (0.199) (0.153) (0.095)
Centre -3.607 -3.305 -3.698 -4.292 0.119 0.299 0.161(0.244) (0.283) (0.216) (0.230)
South -2.649 -2.384 -2.877 -3.056 0.207 0.282 0.062(0.111) (0.144) (0.116) (0.109)
National 2.351 2.021 2.540 2.979 0.257 0.474 0.173(0.160) (0.171) (0.159) (0.186)
North 2.898 2.492 3.121 3.684 0.252 0.478 0.181(0.149) (0.217) (0.160) (0.102)
Centre 2.682 2.384 2.741 3.398 0.150 0.425 0.240(0.268) (0.305) (0.243) (0.258)
South 1.707 1.428 1.932 2.153 0.353 0.508 0.115(0.117) (0.155) (0.131) (0.108)
Mean over the period Rate of change (%)
Panel A: spell    = 2
Income elasticity of poverty
Inequality elasticity of poverty
Panel B: spell    = 3
Income elasticity of poverty
Inequality elasticity of poverty


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continue
National -3.126 -2.718 -3.179 -3.872 0.169 0.425 0.218(0.186) (0.226) (0.160) (0.182)
North -3.736 -3.364 -3.669 -4.571 0.091 0.359 0.246(0.194) (0.305) (0.181) (0.131)
Centre -3.506 -3.086 -3.611 -4.208 0.170 0.364 0.165(0.309) (0.414) (0.238) (0.229)
South -2.402 -1.969 -2.534 -3.092 0.287 0.570 0.220(0.144) (0.210) (0.105) (0.131)
National 2.276 1.865 2.328 3.028 0.248 0.623 0.300(0.190) (0.235) (0.163) (0.185)
North 2.891 2.522 2.814 3.732 0.116 0.480 0.326(0.202) (0.323) (0.186) (0.135)
Centre 2.660 2.240 2.766 3.359 0.235 0.499 0.214(0.327) (0.435) (0.255) (0.247)
South 1.545 1.103 1.684 2.245 0.527 1.036 0.333(0.151) (0.222) (0.111) (0.134)
National -3.290 -3.234 -3.243 -3.371 0.003 0.042 0.039(0.105) (0.195) (0.143) (0.071)
North -3.464 -3.703 -3.450 -3.404 -0.069 -0.081 -0.013(0.159) (0.135) (0.277) (0.081)
Centre -3.481 -2.955 -3.420 -3.738 0.157 0.265 0.093(0.207) (0.452) (0.291) (0.046)
South -3.042 -2.963 -2.974 -3.158 0.004 0.066 0.062(0.133) (0.331) (0.137) (0.091)
National 2.326 2.167 2.259 2.469 0.043 0.139 0.093(0.104) (0.169) (0.132) (0.079)
North 2.587 2.648 2.559 2.603 -0.034 -0.017 0.017(0.141) (0.126) (0.234) (0.084)
Centre 2.543 1.972 2.490 2.803 0.263 0.422 0.126(0.194) (0.362) (0.250) (0.070)
South 1.990 1.843 1.882 2.184 0.021 0.185 0.161(0.101) (0.270) (0.093) (0.092)
Panel C: spell    = 5
Income elasticity of poverty
Inequality elasticity of poverty
Panel D: spell    = 10
Income elasticity of poverty
Inequality elasticity of poverty


Note: standard errors in parenthesis. 80s = 1980-1989; 90s = 1991-1998; 00s = 2000-2004
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Table A.5: Predicted elasticities: different income measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
National -3.930 -3.833 -3.230 2.486 2.531 2.366(0.255) (0.222) (0.255) (0.176) (0.183) (0.191)
North -4.136 -4.522 -3.987 3.099 3.214 3.130(0.176) (0.120) (0.147) (0.089) (0.093) (0.118)
Centre -4.681 -4.495 -3.990 2.977 3.004 2.733(0.694) (0.256) (0.349) (0.131) (0.076) (0.214)
South -3.374 -2.900 -2.188 1.703 1.698 1.513(0.372) (0.226) (0.268) (0.158) (0.142) (0.110)
National -4.069 -3.871 -3.556 2.775 2.646 2.076(0.241) (0.204) (0.209) (0.168) (0.188) (0.188)
North -4.497 -4.549 -4.331 3.397 3.386 2.838(0.152) (0.112) (0.114) (0.087) (0.096) (0.103)
Centre -4.876 -4.463 -4.098 3.211 3.079 2.467(0.532) (0.188) (0.087) (0.090) (0.074) (0.117)
South -3.291 -2.982 -2.607 2.011 1.782 1.214(0.309) (0.189) (0.162) (0.135) (0.132) (0.116)
Income elasticity of poverty Inequality elasticity of poverty
spell
= 1
spell
= 2
spell
= 3
spell
= 1
spell
= 2
spell
= 3
Panel A:         (excluding fnancial incomes)
Panel B:         (including fnancial incomes)
ynfa
y fa
     
Note: standard errors in parenthesis.
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